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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

SAMlJEL R. THURMAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case
No. 8807

ELDON EDWARD PARTRIDGE,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from a decision by Joseph G. Jeppson,
Judge, Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
Utah granting judgment for the defendant and against the
plaintiff of no cause of action on the complaint. This case
was commenced in the City Court for Salt Lake City, Utah
where it was tried and a judgment was entered in favor
of the plaintiff. The defendant then appealed to the Third
District Court where the case was tried to the court setting
without jury.
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The claims of plaintiff arise from a two automobile
collision which occurred on February 18, 1956 at the inter..
section of Cleveland Avenue and Major Street in Salt
Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah. Immediately prior
to the collision plaintiff was operating his automobile in a
northerly direction on Major Street and the defendant
was operating his vehicle in a westerly direction on Cleve..
land A venue.
Major Street and Cleveland Avenue are each two lane,
surfaced streets with dirt or gravel shoulders and there
being no curbing boardering either street. Facing the traf..
fie on Cleveland A venue was posted and erected "Yield
The Right of Way" signs such as are erected throughout
Salt Lake City. Upon the common or southeast comer
there was situated a house and trees between the house
and the south edge of Cleveland Avenue and the east
edge of Major Street.
The time of the collision was approximately 11:20 a.m.
Upon the morning, prior to the collision, snow had fallen
and was six inches deep on the ground and upon the two
streets and in the intersection of Major Street and Cleve.
land Avenue. It had ceased snowing at the time of the
collision.
Plaintiff testified that he was familiar \Vith the inter.
section, the fact that there was a "Yie}d..Right...af..Way''
sign against Cleveland Avenue traffic (TR30) and that
he drove the street daily because he lived a short distance
south of the intersection and he took this route to go to
his work.
Plaintiff approached the intersection from the south at
a rate of speed between 20 and 25 m.p.h. (TR. 25) when
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he was 25 or 30 (TR. 27) feet from the inter~ection he
first observed the dc·fendant's auto approaching frorn the
east (TR. 25). At this first observation defendant was
traveling at 15 m.p.h. (TR. 47) and slowing down (TR. 2o,
TR. 29, 4 7). At this first observation of the defendant by
plaintiff, defendant's automobile was 50 feet east of the
intersection (TR. 27).
Plaintiff was firn aware of danger when his auto was
just entering the intersection and when defendant's vehicle
was approximately even with the "Yield" sign (TR. 28,
Exhibit, TR. 47); plaintiff tried to gain speed but his
wheels were sliding (TR. 29) and defendant attempted to
apply his brakes bur he could not stop because of the
snow (TR. 49).
The impact took place with the front end of defendant's
auto (TR. 30) colliding with the middle of the right side
of the plaintiffs (TR. 30). At the moment of impact the
plaintiff's auto was in the center of Major Street with
the front edge of his automobile at the north edge of the
intersection (TR. 28).
Prior to the collision the defendant first noticed the
plaintiff's automobi1l' when he was at a point even with
the "Yield'' sign and when the front of his vehicle was 20
feet from the east t:dg.~ of Major Street. Defendant ob~
served the plaintiff at this time and plaintiff was 20 feet
south of the south edge of the intersection (TR. 49). De~
fendant attempted to brake, but the brakes were ineffectual
because of the slippery road and defendant attempted to
turn, but this, too, proved ineffectual (TR. 49).
The defendant w:1..; aware of the generally snowy con~
dition of the street all the way from State Street to ~Aainr
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Street (TR. 49). Defendant had observed the "Yield" sign
well before he got to the intersection and knew that it
was a "Yield--Right--of--Way" sign.
The trial of the above case was commenced at 2:00
P.M. of November 20, 1957 and at the end of the afte·r..
noon of that day the parties rested their cases and argu-ment by the respective counsel was set for hearing the next
day at 10:00 A.M. of November 21, 1957.
That immediately prior to the hearing of Arguments
by counsel the trial judge made the statement to counsel
for both parties that he was "ready to decide the case"
whether counsel for plaintiff was ready to argue his case
or not at 10:30 A.M. of November 21, 1957.
While on the bench and as a preface to the Arguments
of counsel which commenced at 10:30 A.M. of Novem..
ber 21, 1957, the trial Judge stated that on that morning
on his way to the Courthouse he had driven his automobile
to the intersection of Major Street and Cleveland Street
in Salt Lake City where the collision occurred. That he
had driven his automobile through the intersection and had
stopped his automobile near the intersection and had esti-mated the distances at which he could observe vehicles
approaching the intersection upon the intersecting street.
That he had observed the trees and house which were
situated on the southeast or common corner between the
approaching vehicles of plaintiff and defendant. That he
h8d observed the widths of the streets and had driven on
Major Street noting the problems of traversing each inter..
section as he crossed it.
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That on the morning of November 21, 1957, prior
to the arguments of counsel and at the time of the view
taken by the Court the general weather conditions were
good and there was no snow on the ground. That the
"yield--right--of-way" sign was not placed at the intersection
and against Cleveland traffic but there was placed a
"stop sign'' against Major Street traffic.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
Point I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING CONTRIBU-TORY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PLAIN-TIFF.
Point II
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Point III
THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS PREVENTED FROM
HAVING A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE OF IRREGULAR-ITY IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT AND
AN ABUSE OF DISCRET!r:)N BY THE COURT.
ARGUMENT
Points I and II
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING CONTRIBU-TORY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PLAIN-TIFF. THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
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This auto collision occurred at an intersection which
was controlled by a "yield--right--of--way" sign imposing the
duty of yielding upon the defendant Partridge. The rights
and duties of the drivers approaching and entering such
an intersection have not been expressly defined by Utah
decisions, but plaintiff relies upon the decisions of this
court with reference to intersection having stop signs or
semaphore control.
The facts presented to the trial court for decision were
that plaintiff was driving at 20 to 25 m.p.h. upon his
approach to the intersection and at a position 25 or 30
feet south of the intersection he observed defendant's
vehicle which was slowing down and was at a rate of speed
of approximately 15 miles per hour; that defendant's ve..
hide was 50 feet east of the intersection. Plaintiff testified
that he was aware of the "yield" sign against defendant;
that he looked to the west for traffic eastbound on Cleve·
land Avenue; that he was first aware of danger when de..
fendant was even with the "yield" sign and as plaintiff's
vehicle was just entering the intersection.
When danger was first known to plaintiff he attempted
to avoid the collision by gaining speed, but due to the
snowy condition plaintiff was unable to avoid the colli.sion.

It is important to note the position of the automobiles
involved at the moment of impact and the point of impact
in the intersection. The evidence clearly sho\\rs that the
front end of the plaintiff's vehicle was even with the north
edge l )f the intersection and that the front end of the de·
fendant's auto collided with the middle of the right side
of plaintiff's vehicle. This picture sho\ving that plaintiff
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was clear of more than half of the intersection while the
front of defendant's vehicle had not traversed even half
of the intersection.
Plaintiff contends that defendant has not shown that
plaintiff is negligent in any respect. Plaintiff acknowledges
that he had the duty of keeping a proper lookout and of
driving at a safe speed for the existing conditions and of
maintaining control over his motor vehicle. There is no
proof that he has breached any of these duties. All the
evidence shows that plaintiff conducted himself as an or~
dinary safe and prudent driver should under the circum~
stances. The evidence shows that he observed the defen~
dant at the first opportunity and that what he saw would
indicate to every reasonable person that the defendant
was going to yield. The speed of plaintiff is not shown
to be excessive under the circumstances.
The plaintiff takes the position that under the cir~
cumstances presented in this case that he had a right to
rely on the "yield" sign and to rely upon defendant to
yield to him and that he did everything in the operation
of his vehicle that an ordinary, careful, prudent person
would do for his own safety under the circumstances. In
the present situation the "yield" sign together with the
speed and approach of the defendant constituted an in~
vitation to the plaintiff, who was approaching the inter~
section on the through highway so close to the intersection
as to constitute an immediate hazard to any vehicle who
was at or near the intersection on Cleveland Avenue, to
proceed on through the highway.
Sherman v. Hall, ... N.Y. 158 N.E. 16
Schleuder v. Soltow, Minn. 59 N.W. 2d 320.
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The defendant, the disfavored driver, had the clear
duty to yield to the favored driver, the plaintiff, and until
the plaintiff was otherwise put on notice, he could presume
that the defendant would yield to him and permit him
to pass.
Bates v. Burns, Utah ... 281 P 2d 209
Martin v. Stevens, Utah ... 243 P 2d 747
Walker v. Peterson, Utah ... 278 P 2d 291
41.-6.-72.10 . . . Utah Code annotated 1953.
Point III
THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS PREVENTED FROM
HAVING A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE OF IRREGU..
LARITY IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT
AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE COURT.
Plaintiff refers to the statement of facts concerning
the conduct of the trial court judge in viewing the inter..
section where the collision between plaintiff and defendant
occurred. The trial judge went to the scene at a time when
there was no snow on the ground which presents a dif,
ferent situation than that which existed upon the morning
of the collision. There being heavy snow freshly fallen
upon the morning and at the time of the collision. The
traffic controls were different at the time of the judge's
visit from those existing at the time of the collision in
that a stop sign had been subsequently erected for Major
Street traffic. Further, there is no showing that physical
evidence which would demonstrate an obstruction upon
the southeast corner of the intersection was similar or
different from the time of the collision.
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There clearly is a proper time for the trial judge sitting
as the trier of fact to view the scene of an auto collision
when such is the subject of a law suit. Plaintiff argue~
that the proper time and proper circumstances are me
when evidence is being taken, when parties to the law SlllL
have notice and opportunity to object and when partie~
may be represented at the viewing. In the matter here
taken on appeal the trial judge saw fit to go to the scene
of the collision and take evidence by estimating distances
and observing whether or not there was an obstruction and
observing the widths of the streets. The trial judge viewed
the intersection without counsel for either side making
a motion that such view be made and said viewing was
made without notice to either counsel that there would
be a view taken of the scene. Further, the trial judge viewed
the intersection after both parties had rested this case and
before counsel had argued their respective case.
Plaintiff most strongly urges this court that a trial
judge in determining the facts concerning a matter on trial
before him is required to observe the same limitations as
the juror would. The trial judge must evaluate the evidence
properly brought before him and he must not, as a juror
must not, upon his own volition proceed to a scene of a
collision and there take evidence upon which he decides
a case.
Brown v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.,
Ga., ... 82 SE 2d 12
Nead v. DiLeva, N.Y.... 66 NE 2d 174
Greenberg v. City of Waterbury, Conn., ... 167

A 83

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
Conner v. Parker, Tex .... 181 SW 2d 873
Atlantic and Broglam Ry. Co. v. City of Cordele,
Ga., . . . 54 SE 155
Wall v. U. S. Mining Co., Utah . . . 232 F 613
Noble v. Kertz and Sons Feed and Fuel Co., Cal.
... 164 p 2d 257
The California Court in Noble v. Kertz case, above
cited, stated clearly the contention of plaintiff when it
made the following statement concerning a substantially
identical problem. "To sanction such a rule would be to
permit a trial judge to take evidence outside of court, with..
out the parties or their counsel being present, and would
effectively deprive a litigant of his constitutional right of
an appeal. Such a rule would amount to a denial of due
process, and certainly would deny to a litigant the fair and
impartial trial to which he is entitled."
The Utah Supreme Court, in Provo River Water Users
Assn. vs. Carlson, 103 Utah 93, 133 P 2d 777 in con..
sidering a case where a juror, during the trial, had a con.versation with a witness, made the following statement:
''The purpose of a trial of the issues is to have the facts
determined impartially and fairly by a court or jury.
Jurors as well as judges must base their verdicts or decisions
on the evidence presented during the trial, not on the
basis of some independent personal investigation or deter.mination of the facts outside of court.''
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff is entitled to a fair trial and he is en.ti tied to know that the evidence considered by the court
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was evidence that was properly and fairly presented to
the court. In the present case there is no ascertaining what
observation and measurements were made by the trial
judge beyond those acknowledged to counsel after the
viewing and prior to argument. Plaintiff respectfully sub-mits that he was deprived of a fair trial by the irregularity
in the court proceedings and the abuse of discretion by the
trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
WARREN M. O'GARA,
Counsel for Appellant
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